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 Abstract 
 Th is article analyzes women’s contemporary use of rights to mobilize and pursue 
claims for gender equality and gender justice in the United Kingdom. Empirically, 
the paper explores the growth of rights discourse and activity against the back-
drop of a stronger constitutionalization of women’s rights at national, European, 
and international levels. It does this through an exploration of individual and 
collective lobbying and litigation strategies in relation to violence against women. 
Th e paper fi rst examines this in the context of the right to bodily integrity through 
examples of the ways in which sexual violence and domestic abuse are addressed 
within the criminal justice system. The paper then addresses the right to be 
free from violence for women seeking refuge and asylum. The research reveals 
the need for varied strategies that target all aspects of the legal and political 
systems in order to ameliorate the protection and implementation of women’s 
rights. 
 Keywords :  gender ,  equality ,  United Kingdom ,  asylum ,  sexual violence ,  human 
rights ,  Human Rights Act 1998 
 Résumé 
 Le présent article analyse l’utilisation contemporaine des droits des femmes 
pour se mobiliser et présenter des réclamations visant l’égalité entre les sexes 
et la justice sexospécifique au Royaume-Uni. Empiriquement, l’article explore 
la croissance du discours et des activités sur les droits dans le cadre d’une constitu-
tionnalisation plus forte des droits des femmes aux niveaux national, européen 
et international. Pour ce faire, l’article explore des stratégies de lobbying et de 
procédures individuelles et collectives en relation avec la violence faite aux 
femmes. Il examine d’abord cela dans le contexte du droit à l’intégrité physique 
à l’aide d’exemples de moyens par lesquels la maltraitance sexuelle et la violence 
familiale sont réglées dans le système de justice pénale. L’article aborde ensuite 
le droit pour les femmes qui cherchent un refuge et un asile d’être à l’abri de la 
violence. L’étude révèle le besoin de diverses stratégies qui ciblent tous les 
aspects des systèmes judiciaire et politique afin d’améliorer la protection et la 
mise en œuvre des droits des femmes. 
 Mots clés :  genre ,  égalité ,  Royaume-Uni ,  asile ,  violence sexuelle ,  droits de l’homme , 
 Loi sur les droits de la personne (1998) 
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 Introduction 
 Th is article analyzes women’s contemporary use of rights to mobilize and pursue 
claims for gender equality and gender justice in the United Kingdom. While the 
legal literature on women’s rights in the United Kingdom has traditionally tended 
to focus on case law analysis, legal reform. and feminist legal theory,  1  literature 
from political science looks at women’s mobilization in the context of political 
struggles for gender equality.  2  Th is article employs an interdisciplinary perspective 
with a view to understanding the impact of women’s social mobilization around 
rights claims. In doing so, it examines the questions of which women use rights 
(for example, individuals, elites, and NGOs), and how they use rights (as lobbying 
tools, court-based challenges, shields, swords, or political mobilizers). 
 Research in this area is overdue in that the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) was 
implemented across the United Kingdom over ten years ago, and it is seven years 
since the ratifi cation of the optional protocol to the Committee on the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 
In that time there has been little study of the impact of these new rights tools 
for women.  3  Similarly, outside the area of employment, there has been little overall 
assessment of the impact of rights emanating from the European Union. Yet the 
current rights regime in the United Kingdom is now being called into question as 
the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition government has begun a consulta-
tion on the future of the HRA.  4  Moreover, the last few years have seen considerable 
institutional change (both national and regional, judicial, and legislative). Little 
research has so far been carried out on the consequences of these changes for 
women’s rights in the United Kingdom. 
 Empirically, the paper explores the growth of rights discourse and activity against 
the backdrop of a stronger constitutionalization of women’s rights at national, 
European, and international levels. Utilizing an examination of women’s mobiliza-
tion around rights emanating from European Union (EU) law and the European 
 1  See, for example,  S.  Atkins and  B.  Hoggett ,  Women and the Law ( Oxford :  Blackwell ,  1984 ) ;  H.  Barnett , 
 Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence ( London :  Cavendish Publishing ,  1998 ) ;  J.  Bridgeman and 
 S.  Millns ,  Feminist Perspectives on Law—Law’s Engagement with the Female Body ( London :  Sweet 
and Maxwell ,  1998 ) ;  J. C.  Conaghan , “ Reassessing the Feminist Th eoretical Project in Law ,”  JLS  27 /3 
( 2000 ):  351 –85 ;  J.  Richardson and  R.  Sandland , eds.,  Feminist Perspectives on Law and Th eory 
( London :  Cavendish Publishing ,  2000 ) . An interesting recent addition to the literature on the framing 
of women’s rights in the legal system is the Feminist Judgments project ( R.  Hunter ,  C.  McGlynn , 
and  E.  Rackley , eds.,  Feminist Judgments: From Th eory to Practice ( Oxford :  Hart Publishing ,  2010 ) ) 
which seeks to write the “missing” feminist judgments in key decisions in English law. 
 2  R.  Lister ,  Citizenship—Feminist Perspectives ,  2nd ed. ( Basingstoke :  Palgrave ,  2003 ) ;  J.  Lovenduski 
and  V.  Randall ,  Contemporary Feminist Politics ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  1993 );  Feminism 
and Equality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) ;  A.  Phillips ,  Feminism and Politics ( Oxford :  Oxford 
University Press ,  1998 ). 
 3  Th e notable exception is two special issues of the journal  Feminist Legal Studies: “Gender Sexuality 
and Human Rights,” eds. J. Conaghan and S. Millns (2005) issue 13; “Encountering Human 
Rights: Gender/Sexuality, Activism and the Promise of Law,” eds. E. Grabham and R. Hunter 
(2008) issue 16. 
 4  “Do we need a Bill of Rights?” Discussion Paper, Commission on a Bill of Rights (London: 
Ministry of Justice, August 2011). Th e fi rst public consultation was established on 18 March 2011 
and closed on 11 November 2011 the second was launched in July 2012 consultation closed on 
September 30, 2012.  http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/cbr . 
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Convention on Human Rights (hereaft er ECHR or Convention), as well as from 
international women’s rights norms and the common law, it explores individual 
and collective lobbying and litigation strategies, including defensive actions, in 
relation to violence against women. The paper first examines mobilization and 
litigation in the context of the right to bodily integrity through the examples of 
sexual violence and domestic abuse and the consequent balancing of rights 
within the criminal justice system. Th e paper then addresses the right to be free 
from violence in the context of women seeking refuge and asylum. The paper 
highlights traditional feminist concerns about the nature of the public/private 
divide and the public invisibility of harms caused to women, while showing how 
claims for gender equality often fail to take account of women’s difference and 
vulnerability especially in situations of persecution and victimization. Th is paper 
also argues that the legal responses to violence against women in relation to diff er-
ent groups in the United Kingdom is paradoxical and, therefore, that a mixed 
approach of legal and extrajudicial mobilization strategies seems most eff ective, 
particularly in relation to vulnerable groups. Th e remainder of this introduction 
briefly establishes the constitutional context for our analysis and highlights the 
particularities of the rights environment in the United Kingdom. 
 Women in Britain have a long history of mass and elite mobilization for rights 
using the political and legal tools of the day. Stronger support for legal rights 
use and formal lobbying was spurred by UK entry into the EU,  5  which not only 
led to the creation of new rights, particularly in employment, and new legislation,  6  
but also to the creation of new institutions. Th e Equal Opportunities Commission 
(EOC) came into being in 1975 and alongside it a new pressure group, Rights 
of Women, formed to take advantage of the new legal opportunity structures 
presented. 
 Th ough the women’s movement in the United Kingdom appeared to become 
more fragmented in the 1980s and 1990s, at this time women also made a greater 
entrance into mainstream politics of political parties, trade unions, and local 
authorities.  7  In particular in the 1990s, a number of campaigns around women’s 
representation were established in the areas of the United Kingdom seeking 
devolution.  8  As a result, women are considerably better represented within the 
devolved Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly than in Westminster.  9  The 
Acts that granted devolution contained in them gender equality provisions that 
placed an onus on the devolved legislatures and other public bodies to consider 
 5  E.  Meehan and  E.  Collins , “ Women, the European Union and Britain ,” in  Women in Politics , eds. 
 J.  Lovenduski and  P.  Norris ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  1996 ) ; E. Meehan, “Women’s Rights in 
Citizen Europe,” Th e Manchester Papers:  http://www.charter88.org/pubs/manpaps/meehan.html . 
 6  Th e Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
 7  P.  Byrne , “ Th e Politics of the Women’s Movement ,” in  Women in Politics , eds.  J.  Lovenduski and 
 P.  Norris ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  1996 )  57 – 72 at 58. 
 8  See  A.  Dobrowolsky and  V.  Hart ,  Women Making Constitution: New Politics and Comparative 
Perspectives ( Basingstoke :  Palgrave ,  2003 ). 
 9  In the Westminster Parliament 22.2 percent of members are women. Th is fi gure compares with 
46.7 percent in the Welsh Assembly and 34.8 percent in the Scottish Parliament (fi gures for March 
2011). See Hansard Society,  Women at the Top: Politics and Public Life in the UK (London: Hansard 
Society, 2012). 
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how their policies would impact on women. Th ese also brought new opportuni-
ties to hold government to account.  10  
 Very importantly in 2000, the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) came into 
force. This Act incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) into domestic law and creates a duty for all public 
bodies in the United Kingdom to abide by ECHR provisions.  11  The Act allows 
claims based on ECHR rights to be brought against public authorities in the 
United Kingdom’s domestic courts and provides for the interpretation of statutes 
and the development of the common law through these rights norms.  12  Th e sig-
nifi cant practice of third party interventions in rights cases has developed at the 
same time, allowing interest groups (such as those promoting women’s rights) to 
put forward their views and raise awareness.  13  In 2004, the UK government rati-
fi ed the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, which grants the right to petition the CEDAW 
Committee.  14  Th is new framework has ushered in a stronger constitutionalization 
of rights in the United Kingdom, and the HRA has acted as a portal for women’s 
international rights norms.  15  Th e acts that granted devolution to Scotland, Wales, 
and Northern Ireland contained gender equality provisions that placed an onus on 
the devolved legislatures and other public bodies to consider how their policies 
would impact on women. Th ese also brought new opportunities to hold govern-
ment to account.  16  
 Partly in response to EU initiatives in extending the principles of equality, the 
United Kingdom passed the Equality Act 2006. Th is extended gender equality duties, 
previously existing only in Wales, to all public bodies across the United Kingdom. 
Th is seems to have great potential. Th e Fawcett Society  17  used this new duty to 
argue that the Conservative and Liberal-Democrat Coalition’s fi rst budget was illegal 
because women bore the brunt of service and benefit cuts.  18  Also in 2007, the 
UK Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) replaced the highly praised 
and respected Equal Opportunities Commission.  19  While some are very ambivalent 
 10  Th e Government of Wales Act 1998 and 2006, s.77, Standing Orders in the Scottish Parliament 
and s.75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. 
 11  Human Rights Act 1998, chapter 42, section 6 creates a duty on public authorities. 
 12  Since courts are also public authorities they are required to develop common law in line with 
Convention rights, and s.3 provides a duty to interpret legislation to be compatible with Convention 
rights “so far as is possible.” 
 13  H.  Samuels , “ Feminist Activism, Third Party Interventions and the Courts ,”  FLS  13 ( 2005 ): 
 15 – 42 . 
 14  While women’s groups had campaigned hard for the government to sign the option protocol to 
CEDAW, the government only adopted this as policy when their hand was forced by a determined 
minister for women who also held a cabinet portfolio. See  C.  Skeet , “ Strengthening Women’s 
International Rights Norms in the UK aft er the Human Rights Act 1998: Lessons From Canada ” 
in  British and Canadian Perspectives on International Law ed.  C. P. M.  Waters ( Leiden :  Martinus 
Nijhoff  ,  2006 ),  149 –68 at 163. 
 15  Skeet, “Strengthening Women’s International Rights Norms in the UK.” 
 16  Th e Government Of Wales Act 1998 and 2006 s.77, Standing orders in the Scottish Parliament and 
s.75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. 
 17  Th e Fawcett Society, named aft er the suff ragist Dame Millicent Fawcett, is a longstanding UK NGO 
that campaigns for women’s equality. 
 18  [2010] EWCH 3522. 
 19  It also replaced the Commission for Racial Equality and the Disability Commission. 
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about this change, it does create new opportunities to mobilize for the recognition 
of intersectional discrimination. Finally, the Equality Act 2010 brought protection 
from nine diff erent forms of discrimination together under one act.  20  Women’s 
groups did not uniformly support the concept of the act, fearing a dilution of prin-
ciples; however, now that the Equality Act is a reality groups are united in calling 
for its full implementation.  21  
 Crucially, the current coalition, which came into government in 2010, has 
ushered in a new period of change and uncertainty. Some duties under the Equality 
Act 2010 that were due to come into force in April 2011 have been put on hold 
with no date for implementation.  22  Government cuts on public spending have also 
had a serious impact on the women’s movement. In June 2010 the Wales Women’s 
National Coalition, which represented over fi ft y women’s groups, was closed when 
the Welsh Assembly said it could no longer fund it. In December 2010, the Women’s 
National Commission, a UK umbrella group representing women’s groups in 
England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, and which had been established 
in 1969, was forced to close. Th e government’s recent announcement of a review 
of the human rights legislation in the United Kingdom has generated a fear that 
the HRA 1998 will be repealed.  23  Th e challenges that these recent changes pose 
for women’s rights mobilization are considered in the sections that follow and in 
the conclusion. 
 Violence Against Women 
 “ . . .[V]iolence against women constitutes a violation of the rights and funda-
mental freedoms of women and impairs or nullifi es their enjoyment of those rights 
and freedoms. . .”  24  
 Under the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW), 
States have positive duties to condemn, punish, and protect women from violence 
whether it takes place in the private or public arena.  25  Th e CEDAW, through two 
general recommendations,  26  has also made it clear that the state has positive 
duties to protect and prevent violence against women.  27  Under the ECHR, violence 
against women has been found to violate Article 2 (the right to life  28  ), Article 3 
(the right to be free from inhuman and degrading treatment  29  ), Article 8 (the right 
to privacy  30  ), and Article 14 (the right to be free from discrimination in relation to 
 20  Age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, race, religion or belief, sex, 
sexual orientation. 
 21  For instance, see the Fawcett Society campaign:  http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/index.asp?
PageID=1025 . 
 22  For example, s.14, which provides for intersectional claims. 
 23  See the responses to the public consultations by the UK Bill of Rights Commission:  http://www.
justice.gov.uk /about/cbr. 
 24  Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women—General Assembly Resolution 
48/104 of 20th of December 1993. Preamble para. 5 
 25  Ibid., Art 1, 2, 4. 
 26  Recommendation 19:  http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm . 
 27  Th e United Kingdom ratifi ed the Optional Protocol to CEDAW in 2004. 
 28  For example,  Kontrova v. Slovakia (2007) 4 E.H.R.R. 482. 
 29  MC v. Bulgaria (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 20. 
 30  Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria (Application no. 71127/01), 12 June 2008. 
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the rights contained in the Convention  31  ). Yet these broad injunctions to States 
need to be translated into specifi c understandings of what constitutes violence 
against women and into specifi c policies and legal provisions to prevent and punish 
such violence.  32  The tenacity of women litigants, their lawyers, and the various 
support organizations that work to promote women’s rights in the United Kingdom 
is well recognized in the fi ght to eradicate violence against women. By examining 
diff erent strategies to address violence against women in several diff erent contexts, 
this paper off ers an intersectional analysis of the success of rights-based activity in 
this domain in the United Kingdom. 
 Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault in the Domestic Context 
 Within the private sphere, there has historically been little legal interest in the 
protection of the female body from “domestic” violence infl icted within the family 
and oft en hidden from the attention of public authorities.  33  In UK law, for example, 
women who had been subjected to years of physical and mental abuse and who 
subsequently killed their violent partner were for many years unable to benefit 
from the defense of provocation, which would have reduced a conviction of murder 
to one of manslaughter.  34  Campaigns to change the law on this mobilized around 
the individual cases of  Ahluwalia and  Th ornton .  35  Justice For Women, a group that 
supports women who have fought back against violent partners, sprang up in 1990 
in response to the  Ahluwalia case and those coming aft er it.  36  Campaign groups 
contrasted the position of these battered women who had killed with that of men 
who have been “provoked” to kill their partner following her nagging  37  or taunts 
about sexual prowess.  38  Men appeared more apt to fulfi ll the “objective” conditions 
attached to the legal defi nition of provocation through their immediate and physical 
reaction to the provocative word or deed and therefore had benefi ted to the detri-
ment of women. By contrast women, following sustained abuse over what is oft en 
many years, and being usually of a slighter physical stature than their tormenter, 
would tend to wait for the “right moment” before killing him, thus giving their 
action the appearance of premeditation. 
 Only in 2000 did the then House of Lords (now the Supreme Court) accept 
the need to modify the definition of provocation to include a more subjective 
 31  Opuz v. Turkey (2010) 50 E.H.R.R. 28. 
 32  Beijing, Platform of Action 1995. 
 33  A.  Howe , “ The Problem of Privatized Injuries: Feminist Strategies for Litigation ,” in  At the 
Boundaries of Law: Feminism and Legal Theory , eds.  M. A.  Fineman and  N. S.  Thomadsen 
( New York :  Routledge ,  1991 ),  148 –67. 
 34  See  M.  Fox , “ Legal Responses to Battered Women who Kill ,” in  Law and Body Politics: Regulating 
the Female Body , eds.  J.  Bridgeman and  S.  Millns ( London :  Sweet & Maxwell ,  1997 ),  79 – 104 ; 
 A.  McColgan , “ In Defence of Battered Women who Kill ,”  OJLS  13 ( 1993 ):  508 –29 ;  K.  O’Donovan , 
“ Defences for Battered Women who Kill ,”  JLS  18 ( 1991 ):  219 –40 ;  K.  O’Donovan , “ Law’s Knowledge, 
the Judge, the Expert, the Battered Woman, and her Syndrome ,”  JLS  20 ( 1993 ):  427 –37. 
 35  R v. Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889;  R v. Th ornton [1992] 1 All ER 306. Southall Black Sisters ran 
a long campaign for Ahluwalia. 
 36  J.  Bindel ,  K.  Cook , and  L.  Kelly , “ Trials and Tribulations—Justice For Women: A Campaign for the 
1990s , ” in  Feminist Activism in the 1990s , ed.  G.  Griffi  n ( Oxon :  Taylor and Francis ,  1995 ). 
 37  R v. Singh ,  Th e Times , 30 January 1992. 
 38  R v. Toi ,  Th e Times , 10 May 1995;  R v. Greech, Th e Times , 22 February 1994. 
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perspective, which allows for the “slow burn” eff ect of domestic abuse to be fully 
considered.  39  Concern still remains, however, that despite this new approach, women 
who kill a violent partner continue to be treated more harshly than their male 
counterparts by the courts, this being now evidenced in gender-biased sentencing 
practices.  40  Th is mirrors the problem raised by Judy Fudge in her analysis of the 
early use of Canadian Charter litigation by feminists—that changing the law without 
changing dominant discourses is ultimately ineff ective in challenging social relations 
of power that subordinate women.  41  
 As far as the crime of rape is concerned, this too has provided opportunities 
for mobilization of the women’s movement as well as preoccupying feminist 
thought. Because of the diffi  culty for victims in proving that they did not consent 
to an assault, it is apparent that judges and juries may simply presume that consent 
did or did not exist based upon their appreciation of the status and identity of 
the victim. Following a study of prosecutions and sentencing decisions in cases 
of sexual assault in Scotland, Sue Moody identifi ed an “ideal profi le” of the victim 
of rape.  42  According to this construction, the more the woman complied with 
a form of correct, innocent, and feminine behavior, the easier it was to establish 
the guilt of the defendant and the greater his sentence. Th e fi ndings of Moody’s 
study are confi rmed by other research that has identifi ed the prevalence of “rape 
myths” in legal discourse, which have resulted in the proliferation in law of stereo-
types of male and female sexual behavior.  43  Among such myths is the presumption 
that women are less likely to have sexual relationships with people they have 
known for only a short while. In light of this, it is not surprising that judges and 
juries are willing to accept that a victim has not consented when the attacker was 
unknown to her. A telling example to this eff ect is the move by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to include rape within the defi nition 
of crimes against humanity, it being readily accepted that female Bosnian Muslims 
would not consent to sexual relations with their Serb aggressors.  44  
 Th e fl ip side of the coin of quasi-presumption of a lack of consent in cases of 
rape by a stranger is the diffi  culty for victims of establishing a similar absence of 
consent in cases where their aggressor was already known to them. Despite the 
 39  R v. Smith [2000] 4 All ER 289: see Burton M., “Intimate Homicide and the Provocation Defence: 
Endangering Women?  R v. Smith ,”  FLS 9 (2001): 247–58. 
 40  M. Burton, “Sentencing Domestic Homicide Upon Provocation: Still ‘Getting Away With Murder.’ 
 R v. Suratan, R v. Humes and R v. Wilkinson (Attorney General’s Reference No. 74, No. 95 and No. 
118 of 2002) [2002] E.W.C.A. 2982,”  FLS 11 (2003): 279–89. 
 41  J.  Fudge , “ Th e eff ect of Entrenching a Bill of Rights upon Political Discourse: Feminist Demands 
and Sexual Violence in Canada ”  International Journal of the Sociology of Law ( 1989 ):  445 –63 
at 460. 
 42  S.  Moody , “ Images of Women: Sentencing in Sexual Assault Cases in Scotland ,” in  Law and Body 
Politics: Regulating the Female Body , eds.  J.  Bridgeman and  S.  Millns ( London :  Sweet & Maxwell , 
 1997 ),  1 ,  213 –39. 
 43  M. W.  Stewart ,  S. A.  Dobbin , and  S. I.  Gatowski , “ Definitions of Rape: Victims, Police and 
Prosecutors ,”  FLS 4 ( 1996 ):  159 –77 ;  J.  Temkin and  B.  Krahé ,  Sexual Assault and the Justice 
Gap—A Question of Attitude ( Oxford :  Hart Publishing ,  2008 ). 
 44  Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic judgment IT-96-23-T & 
IT-96-23/1-T (22 February 2001): D. Buss, “Prosecuting Mass Rape:  Prosecutor v. Dragoljub 
Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic judgment IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (22 February 
2001)”  FLS 10 (2002): 91–99. 
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decision of the House of Lords in  R v. R ,  45  which put an end to the marital rape 
exemption, judges and juries are notoriously less likely to believe that there was no 
consent in cases involving sexual relationships between parties who already knew 
one another.  46  
 A number of women have now turned to the civil law to seek justice following 
rape and sexual assault. Until recently, a block to this was the rigid limitation 
period of six years imposed for intentional torts. In contrast, negligently infl icted 
personal injury was subject to a three-year limitation period, but victims could 
appeal to the court to have the time period extended. Th e law on this was changed 
in January 2008 when a number of victims of rape and sexual assault appealed to 
the House of Lords. In the most prominent case,  A v. Hoare  47  (termed the “lotto 
rape case”), the victim had been raped in 1989, but at the time she did not sue 
because the rapist had very little money. Later, in 2004, he bought a lottery ticket 
while on day release from prison and won seven million pounds. Her attempt to 
sue for the lasting damage caused by the rape was stopped by the six-year limita-
tion period. On appeal to the House of Lords, limitation periods for intentional 
torts were brought in line with injuries caused through negligence. Th e recom-
mendation given was that the more serious the assault the greater the presumption 
of fl exibility in the limitation period. Other related appeals heard at the time included 
victims who had been raped or abused when they were children and were similarly 
time-barred from pursuing claims. 
 A further interesting development in the context of litigation strategy was 
the fi rst private prosecution for rape brought in 1995 with support from Women 
Against Rape and the English Collective of Prostitutes.  48  Th e Crown Prosecution 
Service refused to prosecute the rapes, beatings, and imprisonment of the victims 
because they were sex workers, and it believed they would not be credible witnesses. 
The jury believed otherwise, and as a result of the prosecution, the rapist was 
sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment. Concurrent with the prosecution, 
a report on other failures to prosecute was published by  Legal Action for Women 
and  Women Against Rap e.  49  As a result, an enquiry was launched into the code of 
practice on prosecuting perpetrators used by the Crown Prosecution Service. 
 More worryingly for the advancement of women’s rights and litigation is 
the tendency for the generation of counterclaims once rights are asserted. Where 
balancing of opposing claims is required within the criminal justice system, very 
oft en women’s claims are not prioritized. For instance, one of the earliest rulings 
by the House of Lords under the Human Rights Act 1998 in the area of gender 
equality,  R v. A [2001] 3 All ER 1, engaged precisely in this type of balancing exercise 
to the detriment of women victims of sexual assault. In the context of a rape trial 
and a confl ict between the assertion of the rights of the (male) defendant over 
 45  R v. R [1991] 4 All ER 481. 
 46  R v. Diggle (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 163. 
 47  A v. Hoare; C v. Middlebrough Council; X v. London Borough of Wandsworth; H v. Suff olk County 
Council; Young v. Catholic Care and Others [2008] UKHL 6. 
 48  International Collective of Prostitutes,  Some Mother’s Daughter: Hidden Movement of Prostitute 
Women Against Violence (London : Crossroads Books, 1999). 
 49  Ibid., 45. 
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those of the (female) complainant, the Law Lords showed a worrying tendency 
to replicate the Canadian Supreme Court’s early example of striking down statutory 
“rape shield” law reforms.  50  Although citing the later Canadian case of  R v. Darrach  51  
with some approval, and recognizing the right of the victim to dignity and freedom 
from damaging rape myths, the House of Lords, because of the way the English 
provision was draft ed, followed the earlier case of  Seaboyer  52  in fi nding the rape 
shield provision to be incompatible with the HRA.  53  
 Th us, in  R v. A it was found by the House of Lords that s.41 of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which prohibits the giving of evidence and cross 
examination about any sexual behavior of the complainant except with the leave of 
the court, could amount to a violation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial under 
Article 6 of the Convention. Th e case redraws the balance previously struck by 
parliament towards the protection of rape complainants from harassment during 
the rape trial. Th is is concerning in light of evidence showing the reluctance of 
women to report rape, the brutal nature of their treatment by defense lawyers 
aimed at undermining their credibility and character, and the disinclination of 
juries to convict.  54  
 The decision in  R v. A is disturbing also in that it demonstrated a distinct 
incompatibility in national and European interpretations of the Convention in 
the area of sexual violence, and a partial sightedness on the part of the national 
judiciary in its willingness to look to decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights when interpreting Convention rights (despite the instruction to do so 
in s.2, HRA).  55  There lay at the time within the jurisprudence of the European 
Court the possibility of drawing a diff erent conclusion upon the correct balance 
between the rights of the defendant and those of the complainant in cases of 
sexual violence. In the case of  SW v. United Kingdom and  CR v. United Kingdom 
(1996) 21 EHRR 363, dealing with the end of the marital rape exemption that 
had existed in the United Kingdom until the landmark decision of the House 
of Lords in  R v. R [1991] 4 All ER 481, the European Court found that defen-
dants convicted of the new off ense could not rely on Article 7 of the Convention 
(the principle of non-retroactivity of the criminal law) in order to challenge 
their conviction. Furthermore, the decision of the European Court recognized that 
sexual violence is inherently contrary to the spirit of the Convention, “the very 
essence of which is respect for human dignity and human freedom” ( SW v. UK and 
 50  K. Busby, “Discriminatory Uses of Personal Records in Sexual Violence Cases,”  Canadian Journal 
of Women and the Law 9 (1997): 148–77; T. Murphy and N. Whitty, “What is a Fair Trial? Rape 
Prosecutions, Disclosure and the Human Rights Act,”  FLS 8 (2000): 143–67. 
 51  R v. Darrach [2000] 2 SCR 443. 
 52  R v. Seaboyer and Gayme [1991] 2 SCR 577. 
 53  Skeet, “Strengthening Women’s International Rights Norms in the UK aft er the Human Rights 
Act 1998: Lessons from Canada,” in  British and Canadian Perspectives on International Law , ed. 
C. P. M. Waters (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff , 2006), 149–68 at 157. 
 54  L.  Kelly and  L.  Regan ,  Rape: Still a Forgotten Issue ( London :  Child and Women Abuse Studies 
Unit ,  2003 ) ;  S.  Lees ,  Ruling Passions: Sexual Violence, Reputation and the Law ( Buckingham :  Open 
University Press ,  1997 ) ;  C.  Smart ,  Feminism and the Power of Law ( London :  Routledge ,  1989 ). 
 55  But note that the ECt.HR places Art. 6, the Right to Fair Trial, above the rights of victims to 
justice. See Al– Khawaja and Tahery v. UK Chamber (2009) 49 E.H.R.R 1 and Grand Chamber 
[2011] 15 December, apps. 26766/05 and 2228/06. 
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 CR v. UK (1996) 21 EHRR 363, paras. 44 and 42, respectively). Th e decision in 
 R v. A seemed, therefore, to represent an initial loss for women’s rights in the new 
HRA culture, and this despite the existence of legal precedents to support a more 
sympathetic interpretation and parliamentary intention to protect claimants from 
harassment at trial. Similarly, the experience of Canada immediately after the 
Charter shows us that it is especially in cases of sexual violence that women’s rights 
are most at risk. While the victims in due process cases were usually women,  56  
court cases focused on the confl icting rights of the state and the defendant and 
tended to ignore the victim.  57  
 Yet if there is a positive side to  R v. A , it is the role played by the women’s 
groups Rape Crisis Federation, Campaign to End Rape, the Child and Woman 
Abuse Studies Unit, and Justice for Women, as third party interveners in the case. 
Th e potential for feminist activists to infl uence judicial decision making through 
third-party interventions is of increasing importance, as such interventions off er 
the opportunity to build a litigation strategy that can help shape the development 
of case law under the HRA.  58  So much had already been recognized in the pre-
HRA case of  R v. Smith [2001] AC 146, which concerned the defense of provo-
cation to murder and in which a coalition of feminist groups successfully made 
a written intervention in the House of Lords in order to represent the interests 
of battered women.  59  In this regard, the participation of feminists and women’s 
groups in the litigation process may be seen as a good in itself with success not 
being measured purely in terms of winning or losing a specific case but rather 
in raising public awareness of the extent of sexual violence against women and 
the need to tackle gender-based harms. 
 Sexual Violence, Asylum, and Refuge 
 Asylum and refuge provisions are not always examined as preventative measures 
in relation to violence against women, yet the experience or threat of violence is 
implicit in the concept of “persecution.” Th e intersection of non-citizen status, 
race, and religion with gender in relation to women seeking asylum make asylum-
seeking women one of the most vulnerable groups in the United Kingdom.  60  Th is 
also makes women seeking refuge and asylum more vulnerable to violence within 
 56  M. Mandel,  Th e Charter of Rights and the Legalisation of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Th ompson 
Educational Publishing, 1994), 389. 
 57  See  C.  Dauvergne , “ A Reassessment of the Eff ects of a Constitutional Charter of Rights on the 
Discourse of Sexual Violence in Canada ,”  International Journal of the Sociology of Law  22 ( 1994 ): 
 291 – 308 , 305 ;  F.  Morten and  A.  Allen , “ Feminists and the Courts: Measuring Success in Interest 
Group Litigation in Canada ,”  Canadian Journal of Political Science  34 /1 ( 2001 ):  55 – 84 . 
 58  H.  Samuels , “ Feminist Activism, Third Party Interventions and the Courts ,”  FLS  13 ( 2005 ): 
 15 – 42 . 
 59  M. Burton, “Intimate Homicide and the Provocation Defence—Endangering Women?  R v. Smith ,” 
 FLS 9 (2001): 247–58. 
 60  See  K.  Crenshaw , “ Demarginalising the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique 
of Antidiscrimination Feminist Th eory, and Anti-racist Politics ,”  University of Chicago Legal Forum 
( 1989 ):  139 ;  P.  Aspinall and  C.  Watters ,  Refugees and Asylum Seekers: A Review from an Equality 
and Human Rights Perspective ( Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Report  52 , 
p.  134 ) . Th e authors argue that there has been insuffi  cient attention paid to these intersectional 
characteristics . 
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their domestic relationships, particularly where their status in the United Kingdom 
is dependent on a partner’s asylum claim. Th erefore it is important that persecution 
against women is recognized when the Convention is applied to claims, and that 
women make claims in their own right. Moreover, the need for economic and social 
support for women seeking refuge is recognized as a necessary tool to protect 
against domestic violence in the United Kingdom. 
 Asylum and refuge provisions are based on the premise that states within the 
international community should provide protection for human rights even where 
rights breaches take place outside their state control.  61  Despite the fact that women 
equal or exceed men in relation to global refugee populations,  62  UK figures for 
asylum applications show that far fewer women than men make applications for 
asylum under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereaft er the Refugee Convention).  63  
To claim official refugee status a person must fit within Article 1.A (2) of the 
Convention. This article provides that anyone who “owing to a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of 
a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his [sic] 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself [sic] 
of the protection of that country” shall be considered a refugee.  64  
 Despite its clear application to both men and women, Article 1. A. (2) makes 
no explicit reference to gender, and historical and prevailing perceptions of 
asylum claimants have been narrowly drawn as male.  65  Understandings of politi-
cal activity or religious opinion have excluded women’s experiences. This is an 
area where women are at a particular disadvantage, because their experiences 
do not conform to the “dominant perception of a refugee within the meaning 
of the [refugee] Convention,”  66  and within the refugee system, women have been 
viewed at best as secondary claimants dependent on those defined as refugees. 
Berkowitz and Jarvis suggest that the relative dearth of applications from women 
in their own right is due to two factors: fi rstly, that there is a lack of jurisprudence 
that examines claims from the female experience, and that women may therefore 
not be encouraged to apply, and secondly because “procedural and evidential 
 61  S. F.  Martin , “ Gender and the Evolving Refugee Regime ,”  Refugee Survey Quarterly  29 /2 ( 2010 ): 
 104 –21 ; see alsoA. Edwards, “Displacement, Statelessness and Questions of Gender Equality 
under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,” Legal 
and Protection Policy Research Series: PPLAS/2009/02:  http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
4a8aa8bd2.html . 
 62  Women make up around 50 percent of refugee populations globally (fi gures from the Refugee 
Council UK:  http://www.rcis.org.uk/asylum_process/women ). 
 63  Th e fi gures for 2009 are 16,065 applications from men and 8,225 applications from women 
(Control of Immigration Statistics United Kingdom 2009; Supplementary tables, table 2 j:  http://
www.homeoffi  ce.gov.uk /publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/immigration-
asylum-research/hosb1510/. 
 64  Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees:  http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.
html . 
 65  P.  Goldberg , “ Where in the World Is There Safety For Me? Women Fleeing Gender-Based 
Persecution ,” in  Women’s Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives , eds.  J. S.  Peters 
and  A.  Wolper ( London :  Routledge ,  1994 ),  345 . 
 66  H.  Crawley , “ Gender, Culture and the Asylum Determination Process: Th e Experiences of Refugee 
Women ,” in  Rights of Women Bulletin ( Autumn  2002 ):  5 – 9 at 5. 
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requirements of the domestic asylum process are not equally accessible to both 
men and women.”  67  
 In 1991, in an eff ort to redress some of these inequalities, the UNHCR pro-
duced Gender Guidelines  68  to be read alongside the Refugee Convention as an aid 
to interpretation and process. Th ese introduce gender awareness in several ways: 
by discussing the specifi c situations that might bring women under the diff erent 
heads of the Convention; by asking countries to recognize that a “particular social 
group” can be constructed along gender lines; and by directing countries to examine 
their procedures and processes, including recognizing the additional diffi  culty that 
women may encounter in providing documentary or other evidence. While there 
is acceptance of the failure to properly take gender into account in considering 
claims for refuge and asylum, there is some controversy in relation to both the 
concept and consequence of Gender Guidelines. For instance, some authors argue 
that guidelines promote a focus on women as a social group and underplay the 
recognition of women’s political and religious persecution, thus encouraging a view 
of women as passive victims rather than political actors.  69  
 In 1998, following the example of Canada, the United States, and Australia, 
as well as recommendations by the European Parliament, the UK Refugee Women’s 
Legal Group produced  Gender Guidelines for the Determination of Asylum Claims 
in the UK .  70  Despite a campaign by the Refugee Women’s Legal Group , the guidelines 
were never adopted by the Home Offi  ce. Yet the House of Lords Judicial Committee 
recognized the value of these guidelines in the appeal case  R ., IAT. Ex p Shah  71  
(known as  Shah and Islam ).  Shah and Islam involved asylum appeals by two women 
from Pakistan who had been subjected to violence by their husbands.  72  One of 
the applicants was given advice in her application by the women’s group Southall 
Black Sisters, and this group continued to support the legal team and to campaign 
on behalf of the women. Th e court drew on an Amnesty International report on 
Pakistan, which gave general evidence on the parlous position of women without 
family protection in some parts of Pakistan and on the seriousness of accusations 
of infidelity against women. 
 Both women were unsuccessful in claiming political persecution, but the 
House of Lords Judicial Committee did fi nd that they could claim membership of 
 67  N. Berkowitz and C. Jarvis,  Immigration Appeal Authority: Asylum Gender Guidelines (2000). 
These can be found at  http://www.rcis.org.uk/resources/pages/Asylum+process+resources/
Asylum+gender+guidelines .  C.  Harvey , “ Engendering Asylum Law: Feminism, Process and 
Practice ,” in  Feminist Perspectives on Public Law , eds.  S.  Millns and  N.  Whitty ( London :  Cavendish 
Publishing ,  1999 ) . Harvey also argues that the failure to explicitly refer to gender as a ground 
of persecution is a problem and refers to the neglect of women’s experience as “systematic” 
(“Engendering Asylum Law,” 222–23). 
 68  Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women Prepared by the Offi  ce of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (Geneva, July 1991):  http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/legal/gender_
guidelines/UNHCR_Guidelines_Protection_Refugee_Women.pdf . Th e UNCHR subsequently 
published guidelines in relation to sexual violence in 1995. Th e current guidelines were produced 
in 2002 and are complementary to both these documents. 
 69  S. M.  Akram , “ Orientalism Revisited in Asylum and Refugee Claims ,”  International Journal of 
Refugee Law  12 ( 2000 ):  7 – 40 . 
 70  Found at  http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/linksrhein/archiv/c/c000205.htm . 
 71  [1999] 2 AC 629. 
 72  A summary of the facts is given by Lord Steyn at 636–38. 
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a particular “social group” comprising “all women in Pakistan.” Th ere is no doubt 
that gender guidelines were significant in the determination of this case. The 
UNHCR, as a third party, provided submissions based on the UNHCR gender 
guidelines, and these were praised by the court.  73  All the individual judgments 
also referred to the Canadian case of  Attorney General of Canada v. Ward ,  74  which 
had recognized that gender and sexual orientation could form the basis of a “social 
group” for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. In accepting the concept of 
social group status based entirely on gender, Lord Hoff man also referred explicitly 
to the gender guidelines for the United Kingdom drawn up by the Refugee Women’s 
Legal Group . Th e case gave explicit support for the campaign for gender guide-
lines to be offi  cially adopted. In November 2000, Berkowitz and Jarvis produced 
and issued gender guidelines on behalf of the Immigration Appellate Authority. 
The Refugee Women’s Legal Group was credited as providing the basis for this 
official guidance. Yet the status of these guidelines remained unclear. Although 
they were placed on the Immigration Appellate Authority website, there was 
no obligation on adjudicators to use them and no training given. Further cam-
paigning eventually led to the issue of a “watered down”  75  version in 2004 that 
was just twenty pages long  76  (the original guidelines produced in 2000 were 
over sixty pages). 
 While the fi nding in  Shah and Islam had an impact on decision making by 
asylum adjudicators, particularly in relation to cases involving female genital 
mutilation (FGM), Asylum Aid noted that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal was 
oft en overturning these decisions and adopting a much more restrictive interpre-
tation of “particular social group” than was given in  Shah and Islam.  77  Similarly, in 
2004, the Court of Appeal recognized problems with government appeals to the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT). For instance, in  P and M v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department ,  78  a case that involved the appeals of Kenyan women 
fearing FGM in one case and domestic violence in another, the Court of Appeal 
restored the decisions taken in the women’s favor by the adjudicator and stressed 
the importance of appellate bodies “not seeking to determine appeals to the adju-
dicator afresh.”  79  Th ey also warned against an “overly technical approach” to the 
Refugee Convention.  80  Despite this positive fi nding, a year later, a diff erently com-
posed Court of Appeal appeared to set back any progress. In  Fornah ,  81  the male 
majority of the Court of Appeal found that a woman who fl ed Sierra Leone fearing 
that she would be subjected to FGM was not “persecuted,” since if she underwent 
 73  One of the claimants and her legal team had been supported and advised by Southall Black Sisters: 
 http://www.southallblacksisters.org.uk/history.html . 
 74  [1993] 2 SCR 689. 
 75  Argued by Women’s Asylum News (WAN) 100 (March 2011):  http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/data/
fi les /publications/157/WAN_March_2011.pdf. 
 76  Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim found on the UK Borders Agency website:  http://www.
ukba.homeoffi  ce .gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumpolicyinstructions/apis/
genderissueintheasylum.pdf?view=Binary. 
 77  WAN 41– 48. 
 78  P and M v. Secretary of State for the Home Department EWCA civ [2004] 1640. 
 79  Ibid., para. 48. 
 80  Ibid., para. 45. 
 81  Secretary State for the Home Department v. Fornah [2004] EWCA civ 986 and 680. 
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the procedure it would lead to her complete acceptance in that society. Th e Court 
explicitly rejected the concept of a “social group” made up of all Sierra Leonean 
women, since 80 percent of them had already undergone FGM, and therefore not 
all women in Sierra Leone feared FGM. Th ey also rejected social grouping based 
on “intact” Sierra Leone women, since if subjected to FGM, a woman would no 
longer be a member of that group. In her minority judgment Lady Justice Arden 
disagreed, rejected the majority fi ndings, and rejected the Home Offi  ce appeal. 
 The decision caused widespread alarm within women’s groups, and their 
concerns were supported by a debate on FGM in the legislative chamber of the 
House of Lords that was dominated by the female members of that second 
chamber.  82  The Court of Appeal decision was described by Baroness Kennedy, 
herself a QC, as an “appalling decision” and “a return to a technocratic application 
of the law.”  83  The Home Office tried to blame the Court, but it was argued by 
several of the contributors that the Home Office could not “hide behind the 
failures of the judiciary” since it had instigated the appeal.  84  Baronesses Rendell 
and Kennedy urged the Home Offi  ce to review its position, called for clear gender 
guidelines as were in use in Canada, and urged the Judicial Committee of the 
House of Lords to reverse the  Fornah decision. For the government, Lord Bassam 
claimed that guidelines on gender issues in the asylum process  were in use.  85  
 On appeal to the House of Lords Judicial Committee in 2006, their lordships 
upheld  Fornah ’s appeal and clarified the separation between the requirement 
of individual persecution and membership of a “particular social group.” It was 
stressed that the shared characteristic of the social group must refl ect the “reason 
for persecution,” but that it could include persons who were not persecuted.  86  
Th erefore, a social group need not be cohesive in the way that the Court of Appeal 
had suggested. Th e UNHCR intervened as a third party to the case, and in addi-
tion to the UNCHR Guidelines, the judgments referred to a range of international 
case laws examining the issue. Th e judgment also drew on the Home Offi  ce’s own 
advice and a parliamentary statement from Anne Widdecombe, then a government 
minister, stating that FGM should be considered torture for the purposes of 
asylum.  87  Finally it referred to EU Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004  88  
setting out minimum standards for refugees across member states. 
 While this represented a legal victory in relation to FGM, in the very same year 
a report by Black Women’s Rape Action Project and Women Against Rape found 
that few Immigration Judges (formerly called Adjudicators) ever referred to guide-
lines, and that women were being denied asylum status even where there was good 
evidence to support their case. Research by Asylum Aid also found that women’s 
 82  House of Lords, Hansard Debates, 8 December 2005, cols. 844–868. 
 83  Ibid,, col. 855. 
 84  Ibid,, per Baroness Kennedy, col. 856. 
 85  Ibid., col. 857. 
 86  Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL. 
 87  Lord Bingham of Cornhill, para. 26. 
 88  Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualifi cation and 
status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted: http://eurlex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0083:EN:HTM. 
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claims were still very poorly dealt with and that the revised gender guidelines were 
not being properly applied.  89  Th e report found that where the guidelines were 
referred to, women felt they had been given a fairer hearing.  90  
 In response to this dossier, Lord Hylton raised a parliamentary written question 
asking the government whether they could ensure that the Immigration Appellate 
Authority (IAA) Gender Asylum Guidelines 2000 were always referred to where 
rape was put forward as a form of persecution.  91  Baroness Scotland of Asthal for 
the government replied that the 2000 Gender Guidelines were out of date and had 
been replaced by a body of jurisprudence, and that this was supplemented by the 
Judicial Studies Board Equal Treatment Bench Book. No reference was made to 
the shorter guidelines on gender issues that had been revised and reissued only the 
year before. Baroness Scotland’s comments appear to have misunderstood the role 
of the guidelines since they reach beyond jurisprudence and act as a training aid, 
which helps caseworkers to identify general issues in relation to interviewing tech-
niques and the treatment of claimants. In light of the government’s response, it was 
perhaps unsurprising that research by Asylum Aid in 2010 found evidence of con-
tinuing problems in the handling of women’s claims. Th is report was supported by 
the United Kingdom Border Agency’s (UKBA) own disaggregated fi gures, which 
showed that a disproportionate number of women’s claims were refused at fi rst 
instance and then allowed on appeal.  92  
 Th e ECHR provides an additional protection from return to a “home” country 
for a woman who fears violence (where there is a “real risk” of a “serious breach” 
of an ECHR right).  93  The introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the 
United Kingdom allowed this principle and surrounding ECHR jurisprudence 
to be applied in UK domestic courts. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act states 
that it “is unlawful for any public body to act in a way that is incompatible with 
a Convention right.” Moreover, Article 14 of the ECHR also supports the need 
for a gender-sensitive asylum process. Thus, the HRA 1998 itself was a spur to 
the production of the IAA Guidelines, issued in 2000 just a month after the Act 
came into force. Th e Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 s.65, draft ed in response 
to the HRA 1998, also provided that whenever a human rights issue was raised 
in an asylum application, an appeal should automatically be heard. 
 So the potential to eff ect positive change in this area is strengthened by the 
capacity of ECHR jurisprudence to recognize the state’s responsibility for private 
actors and to allow indirect horizontal application. Th e cases of  Morven Marcia 
McPherson v. Secretary of State for The Home Department,  94   Klondiana Kacaj v. 
 89  S. Ceneda and C. Palmer, ‘“Lip Service’ or Implementation? Th e Home Offi  ce Gender Guidelines 
and Women’s Asylum Claims in the UK” (Asylum Aid, March 2006):  http://www.asylumaid.org.
uk/data/fi les /publications/38/Lip_Service_or_Implementation.pdf. Oft en this was because their 
claims were being fast-tracked, though fast-tracking was contrary to offi  cial guidance. 
 90  Black Women’s Rape Action Project and Women Against Rape,  Misjudging Rape: Breaching Gender 
Guidelines and International Law in Asylum Appeals (London, 2006). 
 91  House of Lords, Hansard, Written Questions, 5 February 2007, col. WA93. 
 92  WAN 98 (December 2010): 2. 
 93  Soering v. United Kingdom (1989) 11EHRR 439; see the partly dissenting opinion of Judges Bratza, 
Bonello, and Hedigan in  Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 494. 
 94  [2001] EWCA Civ 1955, 19 December (Th reat of domestic violence if returned to Jamaica). 
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Secretary of State for the Home Department ,  95  and the case of  Z and A, in Secretary 
of State for the Home Department v. Z, A, and M  96  showed early successes in UK 
courts based on HRA 1998 appeals heard through the s.65 procedure. Even in the 
 Fornah case, discussed above, the Secretary of State recognized that to return 
Fornah to Sierra Leone where there was a real threat of FGM would breach Article 3 
of the ECHR.  97  
 Moreover,  M ( Lebanon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department  98  sug-
gested that the UK House of Lords was willing to go beyond the scope of ECHR 
jurisprudence. Th is went against the usual position of Strasbourg jurisprudence 
that “aliens cannot claim. . . entitlement under the Convention. . .to escape the 
discriminatory effects of family law in their country of origin.”  99  Other cases 
currently on appeal to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR might also suggest that the 
House of Lords in  Fornah took a leading stance on Article 3 rights in this area.  100  
 Yet as Lord Hope recognized in  Fornah , where other claims are available, 
refugee status under the Refugee Convention is not just “of theoretical importance.”  101  
A decision granting refugee status provides greater benefi t and protection than 
a decision under Article 3 not to allow a return in the current climate. 
 If the campaigning by women’s groups and guidance through case law has not 
ensured clear use of gender guidelines, a recent civil action has shown that the 
failure can have fi nancial consequences for government. In  ELS v. Home Offi  ce ,  102  
a Moldovan woman who had been traffi  cked to the United Kingdom, subsequently 
deported, then raped and traffi  cked back to the United Kingdom, sued the Home 
Offi  ce for breaching Article 3 and Article 4 of the ECHR  103  when they failed to 
properly examine her asylum claim before deporting her.  104  Th e case was supported 
by the Poppy Project, a women’s group supporting traffi  cked women. Th e govern-
ment initially fought the case, but following fi erce publicity by the Poppy Project, 
 95  [2002] EWCA Civ 314, 14 March (Th reat of forced abduction and rape if returned to Albania). 
 96  [2002] EWCA Civ 952, 5 July (Th reat of violence to homo-sexual men if returned to Zimbabwe, 
and loss of society of partner in the case of A). 
 97  It is accepted in ECtHR jurisprudence that where there is a real risk of FGM it would breach 
Article 3 to return. 
 98  [2008] UKHL 64. 
 99  EM (Lebanon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 64, para. 7, per Lord 
Hope of Craighead. 
 100  For instance in  Collins and Akaziebie v. Sweden, Application no. 23944/05 (2007), the ECtHR 
found the claimant’s assertion that she had wrongly been refused leave to remain inadmissible. 
Th e ECtHR suggested that because the applicant was resourceful enough to get herself and her 
daughter to Switzerland, she was “strong enough” to protect them both from FGM if they were 
returned to Nigeria (at p. 14). A number of cases are currently pending.  Izeubhai v. Ireland (no. 
43408/08) and  Amerado v. Austria (0969/10) concern appeals against return where there is threat 
of FGM, and  N v. Sweden relates to an appeal against return by an Afghan woman who had been 
living in Sweden and having an extramarital aff air with a Swedish man. She alleges fear of state- 
sanctioned domestic violence if returned. In relation to pending appeals, see ECHR press release: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/39C38938-2E29-4151-9280-D5AC063DD02E/0/
FICHES_ Violence_femmes_EN.pdf. 
 101  Fornah [2006], per Lord Hope, at para. 35. 
 102  Claim no. HQ09X01333. 
 103  Article 3 ECHR is the right to be free from inhuman and degrading treatment and torture. Article 
4 is the right to be free from slavery and servitude. 
 104  H. Wistrich and C. Kilroy,  ELS v. Home Offi  ce Casenote:  www.airecentre.org/.../Advannced_
Immigration_-_ELS_v_Home_Offi  ce_Casenote.pdf . 
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good news coverage,  105  and the parliamentarians Anthony Steen, Baroness 
Nicolson, and Jack Dromey raising the issue in the House of Lords and House 
of Commons,  106  the government decided to relinquish the fight and settled out 
of court for 130,000 pounds.  107  Th is example of the role of the press and parliamen-
tary debate in the settlement illustrates the importance of discursive opportunity 
structures in the activation of women’s rights, as discussed by Gesine Fuchs in 
her contribution to this collection. 
 A second focused campaign relates to the economic and social rights of female 
refugee and asylum seekers, their access to services and support, and their freedom 
from violence in the United Kingdom as host country. In 2007, a joint campaign 
was launched by over forty leading NGOs for women’s rights and human rights 
groups, opposing the application of the “no recourse to public funds rule” for 
women who are victims of domestic violence. Lobbying against the “no recourse” 
policy has been happening since the 1990s. Early, successful lobbying led to 
changes in the law so that women who were dependents of asylum seekers would 
no longer be deported—provided that there was evidence of domestic violence—in 
situations where their relationship broke down within the “probationary period.”  108  
Prior to this, the threat of deportation had forced women to remain in abusive 
relationships. In practice, though, the real benefi t of this change in the law was 
negated by the fact that women who leave their partners in those circumstances have 
no recourse to “public benefi ts” while their individual clams are being determined—
though they may be entitled to local government support or support from the 
National Asylum Support Service. While this “no recourse” rule applies to all asylum 
seekers, it creates particular problems for victims of domestic violence, because 
the nature of the assistance can mean that “women and children are oft en isolated 
in accommodation/removal centres or other inappropriate housing and desig-
nated areas, where they are easily targeted by violent spouses/partners or relatives, 
and lack access to essential safe and specialist refuge and support services.”  109  
Th ough Oxfam was not a member of this campaign, it also released a report in 
2008 on the impact of this rule on South Asian women in the United Kingdom and 
raised human rights concerns around the policy.  110  
 Problems have been compounded by very mixed practice among councils. 
Some local authorities were eff ectively preempting the asylum process by stating 
that, where women could get family support in their home country, they would be 
off ered an air ticket home but no other support. A 2010 judicial review hearing 
 105  T.  Rayment , “ Traffi  cked, Raped, Deported: Story of a Sex Slave ,”  Sunday Times ( 3 April  2011 ):  15 . 
 106  J. Dromey, 5 April 2011, Hansard Commons Debate, col. 884. 
 107  http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/apr/19/sex-traffi  cking-uk-legal-reform; Press Release From 
Legal Team Representing Traffi  cked Woman In Ground Breaking Claim Against the Home Offi  ce, 
11 April 2011. 
 108  See Southall Black Sisters, Th e Two Year Rule Campaign, http;// www.southallblasck sisters.org.uk/
campaign_oneyearrule.html. (accessed May 2011). 
 109  Southall Black Sisters, Executive Summary of Proposed Amendments to Domestic Violence, 
Crime and Victims Bill 2003—Report Stage, 4, 9, and 11 March 2004, House of Lords at p. 2. 
 110  S. Anitha, P. Chopra, W. Farouk, Q. Hag, and S. Khan,  Forgotten Women: Domestic Violence, 
Poverty and South Asian Women with No Recourse to Public Fund s, 2008  http://www.oxfam.org.
uk/resources/ukpoverty/downloads/forgottenwomen.pdf . 
 186   Susan Millns and Charlotte Skeet
(with the NGO Shelter intervening) of just such “assistance” by Birmingham 
City Council,  111  made it clear that this was unacceptable. Now, councils must 
offer local support to women while their asylum claims are ongoing, unless the 
claims are believed to be “abusive or hopeless.”  112  Despite this success, there has 
been little movement by the government on other aspects, but the campaign 
continues to grow.  113  
 Pulling together both issues and highlighting discrimination against non-
national women in the United Kingdom is the Every Single Woman campaign. 
 The Rights of Women Seeking Asylum: A Charter  114  was launched in 2008  115  by 
a number of different women’s groups under the coordination of the Refugee 
Women’s Resource Project. It refers to the right of all UK asylum seekers to be 
treated fairly under domestic and international obligations, and in relation to 
this, it highlights gender equality duties incumbent on the United Kingdom under 
CEDAW, the Treaty on European Union, the HRA 1998, and the Equality Act 2006. 
Among other things, the Charter calls for the implementation of gender guide-
lines,  116  eff ective management of gender mainstreaming by the United Kingdom 
Border Agency, “accommodation, support and healthcare appropriate to their 
needs as women,” and specifi cally “the alleviation of the gender impact of policies 
which lead to destitution.”  117  It also refers to the need “to ensure that those who 
may have been trafficked into the United Kingdom have full and appropriate 
access to the asylum determination system.”  118  Two years on from its launch, it 
is supported by 211 groups in the United Kingdom.  119  It seems that this level 
of coordinated mobilization has had a real impact. For instance, the UKBA 
appointed a Gender Champion in March 2010 and has reviewed its procedures.  120  
The experience of earlier campaigns shows that successes can never be taken 
for granted and that pressure must be kept up to ensure there are no slippages. 
 Conclusions 
 This article demonstrates the growing number of ways in which women have 
mobilized around key legal and social issues in the United Kingdom. Th e aim, too, 
has been to illustrate mobilization around both individual legal cases and legisla-
tive change. Th ese two possibilities are inevitably interlinked and oft en feed off  
 111  R v. Birmingham City Council ex parte Clue [2010] EWCA Civ 390. 
 112  Some local authorities have established a network to share best practice. No Recourse to Public 
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(March 2011):  http://www.islington.gov.uk/DownloadableDocuments/CommunityandLiving /Pdf/
equalitydocs/NRPF_national_picture_fi nal.pdf. 
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00010001001000020001 
 114  http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/data/fi les/charter.pdf . 
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each other. Th e paper has aimed also to take account of the impact upon mobilization 
of constitutional change, the political and economic climate, and the construction 
of structures, groups, and institutions to deliver fairer outcomes for women. Our 
conclusion is that progress on gender equality issues has undoubtedly taken place 
in the United Kingdom, particularly in the last forty years. It does, however, remain 
slow and requires that constant off ensive and defensive strategies be deployed by 
feminist activists and women litigants. In this respect, it is heartening to see that 
elite women within Parliament, government, and the courts are providing support 
and publicity for the wider mobilization of women. Th is highlights the importance 
of women’s participation in formal political institutions and of women’s represen-
tation in the higher courts in the United Kingdom. 
 What stands out in the UK experience is the scope and range of legal mobiliza-
tion around rights, be they derived from the common law, criminal law, private 
prosecution, the ECHR, EU law, or lobbying using CEDAW. While women’s rights 
implementation everywhere requires the passage of specifi c legislation to be most 
eff ective,  121  a distinctive feature in the United Kingdom is the need for mixed 
strategies that do not just focus exclusively on either parliamentary or court-based 
activity. Th is is in part because of the nature of parliamentary sovereignty in the 
United Kingdom. Even aft er the Human Rights Act, the courts cannot strike down 
problematic legislation in the same way as other Supreme or Constitutional Courts 
in Europe and elsewhere. It is also apparent from the UK experience that there is 
an interrelationship between the courts and parliament. Th e impact of these unifi ed 
approaches in relation to the rights of asylum seekers seems clear. 
 Also important has been the role of institutional bodies. For instance, the 
Women’s National Commission has brought together a number of partnerships over 
the years and acted to publicize campaigns. In view of the limited resources available 
to many women’s groups who are struggling to provide basic services, it is not clear 
what impact the loss of this coordinating group will have on future campaigns. 
Moreover, in attempting to meet commitments to provide support for women 
victims of violence, the government is choosing to contract with less radical groups. 
For instance the Poppy Project, which supported traffi  cked women, has lost its 
funding, and support for traumatized women who have been traffi  cked or raped is 
now contracted to the Salvation Army, an institution that has no expertise in the 
area and that has religious affi  liations. Th ough the Commission for Equality and 
Human Rights has intervened in a number of cases it, shows no appetite to support 
litigation strategies. Yet, it seems clear that the key cases discussed here have pro-
vided much-needed support for campaigns. What is also clear is that the courts 
might not have reached their decisions were it not for the persistence of women’s 
groups in providing guidelines, drawing on national and international rights dis-
courses, and evidencing the problems for women caused by the current system. 
 Also specifi c to the United Kingdom in comparison to other European countries 
is the influence of Canadian as well as European experience on domestic law. 
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In this sense, the HRA acts as a conduit for women’s international rights norms 
beyond the ECHR.  122  Th e Canadian Gender Guidelines provided a model for the 
UK development of guidelines, and Canadian case law has been infl uential in the 
UK courts. For instance, the House of Lords drew on  Attorney General v. Ward in 
the ground-breaking UK case of  Shah and Islam, and looked to Canadian jurispru-
dence when examining the rape shield provisions in  R v. A . Unfortunately, in the 
latter case, the legislation had not been draft ed with reference to the Canadian 
jurisprudence, and the case was unsuccessful from a women’s rights standpoint. 
Similarly, with the ECHR there is some ambiguity for women in the way in which 
European Convention rights are being incorporated into the domestic sphere. 
 We have revealed, too, how intersectional approaches to women’s rights claims 
can produce varied outcomes. Women who are subjected to violence and who 
encounter the legal system as asylum seekers or refugees have a diff erent experi-
ence and diff erent hurdles to surmount when compared to those women whose 
encounters are through the criminal justice system. Both of these situations also 
reveal diff erences in the treatment of women seeking rights as compared to men. 
Above all, rights themselves are not everything in the pursuit of gender justice and 
gender equality.  123  Our research reveals the need for mixed methods and varied 
strategies that target all aspects of the legal and political systems. Mobilization 
works best when there is an alignment of feminist interests and a strong motiva-
tion to address injustice across a range of institutions. Campaigners, lawyers, and 
litigants have to be vigilant to protect hard-won gains and to spot opportunities for 
advancement. Rights are indeed both swords and shields and require skillful and 
strategic deployment in the courts, but this is done best alongside lobbying, cam-
paigning, and eff orts to raise political awareness and public attention. 
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